The power outage in Berlin since 3 January 2026 is extraordinary in its scale, but remarkably familiar in its causes and political consequences. Five damaged high-voltage cables, tens of thousands of households without electricity and heating, restrictions on mobile communications, transport, schools and supplies – the factual situation is clear and serious. It is equally clear that, according to the unanimous assessment of the police and politicians, this is a targeted, terrorist-motivated attack on critical infrastructure.
There is little new about this. Previous arson attacks on electricity pylons, acts of sabotage on railway facilities and disruptions caused by drones over airports have already shown how vulnerable central supply and transport systems are. The now renewed realisation that critical infrastructure in Germany is ‘vulnerable’ has also been part of basic security policy knowledge for years. This situation has been indisputable since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the daily hybrid attacks.
Nevertheless, the Berlin case shows once again how wide the gap between knowledge and action is. It is no secret that operators of electricity and gas networks are obliged to make detailed maps, route alignments and technical parameters publicly available. Nor is it news that this data is available digitally, permanently and without effective access restrictions – and can be systematically evaluated using AI-supported tools. The warnings from the BDEW and the network operators were on the table long before the current attack.
Nevertheless, the political response is only now coming – with calls for a reassessment of transparency requirements, more video surveillance, additional redundancies and the relocation of the last above-ground sections of the lines underground. At the same time, reference is made to the KRITIS umbrella law, which has yet to be implemented and has been considered a central building block for improved protection of critical infrastructure for years. The fact that this law is still not in force at a time of real supply crisis speaks for itself.
This paints a picture of a policy that can describe crises precisely once they have occurred, but whose prospects for action remain largely retrospective. Prevention becomes hindsight, resilience becomes a promise of announcements. The qualification clearly lies less in the avoidance of crises than in the routine management of their consequences.
The ironic constant here is that only when 45,000 households are without electricity and a state of emergency is declared is the situation considered serious enough to finally give known problems political recognition. At least then it is possible to credibly explain why ‘no more time must be lost’ – a phrase that reliably only comes up in German crisis policy when precisely this time has long since been lost.
At the same time, it would be factually incorrect to focus exclusively on political failures. Those actors who, beyond strategy papers and debates about responsibilities, have actually managed the crisis deserve explicit recognition. Firefighters, police, THW, network operators and technical services worked professionally under great time pressure, adverse conditions and ongoing investigations, restoring power faster than initially predicted – according to consistent reports, even a day earlier than expected.
This achievement is not a minor aspect, but rather proof of the state’s ability to act effectively in an emergency. While politicians were still discussing causes, assessments and future legislative initiatives, repairs, switches, safeguards and supplies were being put in place on the ground. Crisis intervention took place where it belonged: pragmatic, coordinated and results-oriented.
The sobering conclusion is therefore that the operational level delivered, while the conceptual level lagged behind. Or to put it another way: while some were still explaining why action was needed, others had already taken action. The fact that the lights in Berlin came back on earlier than announced is less a success of political control than a credit to those professionals who do not comment on crises, but resolve them.
