Digital sovereignty will remain limited as long as Europe’s cloud infrastructure remains technologically dependent
The announced partnership between Thales and Google Cloud demonstrates, on the one hand, how seriously Europe now takes the issue of digital sovereignty. On the other hand, however, it also reveals a fundamental structural problem in European digital policy: even one of Europe’s leading security and defence companies apparently does not currently see itself as capable of establishing a sovereign cloud infrastructure entirely without US hyperscalers.
This is precisely where the real significance of this partnership lies.
For the central question is not whether the project is structurally sound from a regulatory perspective. The more crucial question is rather: why does Europe not yet have a comparable cloud and AI infrastructure that is entirely under European control – technologically, operationally and economically?
European sovereignty on American technology
The partnership is clearly attempting to resolve a conflict of political and regulatory objectives. On the one hand, European companies require state-of-the-art cloud, AI and scaling technologies. On the other hand, there is a growing need for regulatory control, data protection and safeguards against extraterritorial access.
Yet this is precisely where a contradiction arises: if European sovereignty is only possible through a combination with American hyperscale technology, that sovereignty will inevitably remain limited.
For regardless of organisational separations or local operating models, the technological foundation remains heavily dependent on US platforms. Europe may then control operations, governance and regulatory structure – but not the actual core digital technology.
This is strategically problematic.
Europe’s hyperscaler gap becomes apparent
The cooperation thus indirectly highlights just how far behind Europe has fallen in the field of globally scalable cloud infrastructures.
Whilst the US dominates the global cloud market with companies such as Google Cloud, Amazon Web Services and Microsoft, Europe still lacks a genuine technological rival with comparable innovation and scaling capabilities.
This dependency becomes even more critical in the age of AI. Modern AI systems require enormous computing capacities, global platform architectures and highly optimised data infrastructures. Whoever controls this infrastructure will, in the long term, also control large parts of digital value creation.
Europe therefore runs the risk of defining regulatory standards whilst remaining permanently dependent on non-European platforms for technology.
Thales is acting pragmatically – but Europe is strategically defensive
From Thales’s perspective, the partnership makes sense. The market demands high-performance AI and cloud solutions – particularly in healthcare, the financial sector and the public sector. At the same time, customers expect the highest standards of security and compliance.
The combination of European security and governance expertise with the technological capabilities of Google Cloud therefore appears economically logical.
Companies such as Thales, in particular, have decades of experience in highly critical sectors such as defence, cybersecurity and digital identities. These capabilities make the group a credible operator of sovereign infrastructures.
Nevertheless, the partnership ultimately remains a sign that Europe continues to act defensively in strategic terms: instead of consistently building its own digital ecosystems, American technologies are being ‘contained’ through regulation.
This is pragmatic in the short term – but in the long term, it does not constitute genuine technological independence.
Sovereignty means more than data protection
There is another point to consider: the European debate on digital sovereignty often focuses heavily on data protection and compliance. Yet true sovereignty encompasses much more.
It also concerns:
- Control over hardware and chip supply chains
- Access to AI models
- Cloud architectures
- Software stacks
- Operating platforms
- Update mechanisms
- Technological innovation cycles
As long as key digital infrastructure components are predominantly developed outside Europe, European sovereignty remains structurally limited – even if data is physically stored in Europe.
Europe needs its own industrial digital policy
It is precisely for this reason that the partnership must also be seen as a warning sign for industrial policy. Europe certainly has strong companies in the security, industrial and infrastructure sectors. What is lacking, however, is a consistently structured digital industrial policy with a strategic long-term vision comparable to that of the US or China.
Whilst American hyperscalers scaled up massively over the years, Europe’s cloud market fragmented into individual national initiatives, regulatory debates and comparatively small provider structures.
Projects such as Gaia-X have certainly demonstrated the political will for greater sovereignty, but have so far failed to establish a genuine European hyperscale alternative.
The danger of ‘managed dependency’
This is precisely why there is a risk that Europe will settle into a kind of ‘managed dependency’ in the long term: the infrastructure remains technologically American, whilst Europe primarily builds up regulatory and organisational control mechanisms.
This may create stability in the short term, but it does not solve the actual strategic problem.
For technological sovereignty does not arise solely from compliance structures, but from Europe’s own innovation and infrastructure capabilities.
Nevertheless, the partnership is important
Despite this criticism, however, it would be wrong to dismiss the cooperation outright. On the contrary: under current market conditions, the model is probably one of the most realistic ways of combining European security and sovereignty requirements with modern hyperscale technology at all.
For operators of critical infrastructure, public authorities or regulated sectors in particular, a locally controlled infrastructure under European leadership is significantly better than complete direct dependence on global standard cloud models.
The partnership can therefore certainly be seen as a pragmatic interim step – though not as a definitive solution to the question of European sovereignty.
Europe’s crucial question is yet to come
The real strategic challenge therefore lies elsewhere: will Europe use such partnerships as a transitional model to build up its own key digital technologies in the long term? Or will a model become permanently established in which European companies take over governance, but the technological substance continues to originate from the US?
It is precisely this question that will determine whether Europe truly achieves digital sovereignty in the future – or merely a better-regulated form of technological dependence.


