In his statement, Hesse’s Interior Minister Roman Poseck paints a deliberately clear picture of left-wing extremism as a threat to security. The core of his position is clear: left-wing extremism is not understood as a marginal phenomenon or merely a side issue of social protests, but as an independent, increasingly radicalised form of extremism that directly attacks the state, infrastructure and public security.

What is remarkable is the strategic classification. Poseck avoids relativising it in comparison to right-wing extremism, explicitly recognising it as the greatest threat to democracy at present, but at the same time warns against a security policy imbalance that allows other areas of extremism to slip out of focus. Hesse is thus positioning itself against selective counter-extremism and emphasising the principle of equal treatment of all extremist ideologies.

The case numbers and specific examples of crimes cited underpin the political claim with empirical and operational references. In particular, the increase in left-wing crimes, sabotage of critical infrastructure, arson attacks and outing campaigns illustrate that parts of the scene are moving from symbolic protest to deliberately calculated criminality. The emphasis on anti-Semitic tendencies in the context of pro-Palestinian mobilisation also broadens the focus beyond traditional fields of action and points to ideological cross-references that are more difficult for security authorities to grasp.

The emphasis on the state’s monopoly on the use of force is also consistent with security policy. Poseck makes it clear that attacks on the police and state institutions are not to be regarded as ‘civil disobedience’ but as a fundamental challenge to the rule of law. This clear demarcation is particularly important against the backdrop of social polarisation.

At the same time, the approach is not repressively narrow. The announced strengthening of preventive measures, especially with regard to young people, demonstrates the effort to interrupt radicalisation processes at an early stage. In doing so, Hesse is following the established security policy consensus that sustainable counter-extremism can only be effective through a combination of law enforcement, intelligence gathering and prevention.

Overall, Hesse is formulating a clear, consistent position in terms of regulatory policy: there is no such thing as ‘acceptable’ extremism. Anyone who opposes the free democratic basic order, regardless of their ideological leanings, will be treated as an enemy of the constitutional state. This clarity may be politically polarising, but it contributes to security policy orientation in an increasingly fragmented debate.

The concept comprises the following seven areas of action:

1. Monitoring / comprehensive overview of violence against public sector employees: The aim is to highlight assaults and violence against public sector employees and to reliably identify developments and trends.
2. Development of a prevention database: To enable employers, public authorities and employees to quickly and easily identify the measures best suited to their needs, the information will in future be stored centrally in a prevention database.
3. Authority-specific crisis and emergency plans: Authority-specific crisis and emergency plans provide public authorities and institutions with clear and unambiguous processes, structures and responsibilities. These include structural, technical, organisational and personnel measures before, during and after an incident of violence – such as first aid, firefighting and evacuation measures.
4. Accident reporting: The state concept has compiled comprehensive information on the subject of accident reporting in the event of violent incidents. Employers and public service authorities are required to inform employees and supervisors about regulations governing the reporting of accidents at work and on duty and to provide the necessary documentation.
5. Legal measures: Once it has commenced its work, the central, nationwide contact point for violence prevention will provide general information on legal options for self-defence and accident prevention on its central website.
6. Support services: It is important that public sector employees receive appropriate support after an incident of violence in order to minimise the impact on their health and help them cope with the incident. To this end, support and counselling services will in future be provided centrally on a website.
7. Contact points for violence prevention: A central, nationwide contact point for violence prevention in the public sector is to be affiliated with the existing ‘Central Contact Point for Public Officials and Elected Representatives’ of the Baden-Württemberg State Criminal Police Office. The contact point will be active in prevention and public relations, counselling and support for those affected, and networking.