This is an incident of considerable significance: at 1.43 am on the night of 8 June 2026, several fires broke out at a substation in Reutlingen. The result is massive power cuts, which, according to the city, temporarily affect around 40,000 households and 7,600 buildings. Hospitals, care homes, communication networks, transport infrastructure and countless aspects of daily life come under pressure. Reutlingen Hospital must be secured, emergency power supplies are set up, and disaster response structures are activated. The District Office declares an “exceptional emergency situation”.
And yet, public communication initially seems almost routine. Almost in passing, there is talk of a cause of the fire that is being investigated “in all directions”. Only later does the Baden-Württemberg State Security and Anti-Terrorism Centre (SAT BW) take over the investigation. A dedicated investigation team is set up. It is explicitly examined whether an arson attack or even a terrorist act could lie behind the incident.
It is precisely at this point that a fundamental question arises: why do the public and the business community often only learn gradually of the actual potential threat posed by attacks on critical infrastructure?
When a possible terrorist act is under consideration and, at the same time, tens of thousands of citizens are affected by a power cut, this is no ordinary incident. The power supply is the foundation of almost all other critical services. Without electricity, communication networks, payment systems, cold chains, traffic control systems and medical care function only to a limited extent or not at all. The consequences extend far beyond the inconvenience of a power cut.
This is precisely why the widespread practice of initially downplaying threat situations or revealing their scope only bit by bit is problematic. Transparency does not mean jeopardising ongoing investigations. However, transparency does mean openly acknowledging the actual seriousness of a situation and not only gradually providing the public with information that was security-relevant from the outset.
It is particularly noteworthy that an increased police presence at critical infrastructure sites was ordered shortly after the incident. Such a measure is not taken without reason. It shows that the security authorities are taking the possibility of a targeted attack very seriously indeed. This makes it all the more important to communicate this assessment just as clearly to the public.
Citizens have a right to know whether they have witnessed a technical fault, a serious criminal offence or possibly an attack on critical infrastructure. Experience in recent years shows that, particularly in cases of sabotage, arson or suspected politically motivated attacks, weeks or months often pass before the true extent of the incident becomes publicly apparent.
Equally important is the question of who is responsible. Those who attack critical infrastructure are not merely attacking facilities and technology, but the very functioning of our society. That is why the investigation must not remain vague. The public rightly expects not only that the cause be established, but that those responsible be named and shamed – regardless of whether, in the end, extremists, foreign actors, lone perpetrators or other groups of perpetrators are found to be responsible.
The incident in Reutlingen demonstrates once again how vulnerable modern societies are. But it also shows that we need a new culture of openness when dealing with attacks on critical infrastructure. Terrorism, sabotage and hybrid attacks must not be normalised, either in language or in communication. When tens of thousands of people are affected and counter-terrorism investigators take over, this is no minor footnote. It is a security incident of the highest order – and should be treated as such.
