Why the new players in the airspace are challenging state sovereignty and what lessons Africa and Asia offer for a global security architecture

The following analyses are based on the findings of strategist and geopolitical analyst Adnane Kaab, a former officer in the Royal Moroccan Air Force, who examined the security policy implications of drone technology at international borders in his article ‘Drones and Borders: Fragmented Responses or a Global Framework?’.

A new dimension of border security – how drones are changing the balance of power

Borders have always been more than just lines on a map – they are an expression of political order, technological capabilities and geopolitical interests. From watchtowers and border fences to orbital satellites, each generation has created its own tools to make sovereignty visible and security tangible. But none of these innovations has changed the border area as profoundly as the drone.

What was once military high-tech is now a mass-produced commodity: small, inexpensive and highly adaptable. Drones have become symbols of a new era in which state control and non-state agility are in direct competition. They fly over fences, bypass sensors, map territories – and they do so for a wide variety of clients: for armies as well as smugglers, for research institutions as well as rebel groups.

This technological penetration of airspace is changing the rules of international security. Borders, long places of clear state authority, are transforming into hybrid zones in which surveillance, prevention and response must be constantly rebalanced. States are faced with the question of whether to shape the drone era or be overwhelmed by it.

From an exclusive military instrument to global all-purpose technology

Just a few years ago, unmanned aerial vehicles were the privilege of large armed forces. Now, the spectrum ranges from simple recreational quadcopters to highly autonomous military systems. This democratisation of air technology means that states are no longer the sole actors in airspace.

Drones open up enormous opportunities for governments: they allow permanent surveillance of hard-to-reach border regions, reduce the cost of patrols and provide real-time reconnaissance data without endangering personnel. Countries with long land or sea borders – such as those in Africa or Asia – benefit particularly from the new mobility of sensor technology.

But the same characteristics that make drones attractive to states are also exploited by their opponents. Smugglers, human traffickers, militias and terrorist groups use them for reconnaissance, transport or targeted attacks. This creates an asymmetrical race between state control and non-state adaptability – a phenomenon that is leading to a domino effect in security policy in many border regions.

Borders in transition – drones as geopolitical catalysts

The spread of drone technology is more than just a technical development: it is changing the relationship between the state, society and the monopoly on the use of force. The airspace above border regions is increasingly becoming a contested space in which state security forces and non-state actors confront each other with the same tools.

A simple example illustrates the dilemma: a drone can transport illegal cargo as well as support an early warning system. The same platform, the same technology – but opposing goals. This puts pressure on traditional security models that have hitherto been based on territorial control and physical presence.

This technological ambivalence hits regions with weak governance particularly hard. Africa’s Sahel region is one such example. Where state structures are already fragile, drones exacerbate existing instabilities and shift the balance of power in favour of non-state actors.

Africa: The Sahel as a laboratory of acceleration

In the Sahel region, drone technology has developed from a marginal phenomenon into a strategic problem within just a few years. The region is characterised by huge, difficult-to-control border areas and a multitude of armed groups. While state security forces are only just beginning to use drones systematically, smugglers and militias have long since learned to use them for reconnaissance and logistics.

The speed of this development is remarkable. Technologies that were tested in the Ukraine war in 2022 – such as manoeuvrable first-person view drones or fibre-optic-controlled variants that circumvent radio interference – appeared in West African conflict zones as early as 2024. The cycle between innovation and imitation is shrinking dramatically.

For security agencies, this means that the time required to adapt doctrine, procurement and legal regulation is shrinking radically. Border patrols designed for road checks suddenly have to respond to aircraft that fly low, are quiet and difficult to detect. In addition, the use of cross-border drones raises legal questions: Can a state intercept an unknown flying object beyond its borders? Who bears responsibility in the event of an incident?

The number of players is growing – and with it the complexity. Jihadist groups use commercially available drones for reconnaissance and target acquisition, while criminal networks use them to monitor transport routes or to drop drugs and weapons. This shifts the conflict from land and road to airspace – a dimension for which many states have neither technical nor legal preparation.

Africa thus demonstrates in concentrated form what can be observed globally: the technological advantage of states is melting away, response times are shortening, and the boundary between civil and military is blurring.

Asia: Between technological armament and regulation

While Africa is primarily struggling with capacity gaps, Asia is characterised by geopolitical competition. Here, it is less a question of a lack of control than of the race between major powers to systematically integrate drone technologies into their security architectures.

A striking example is the border between India and Pakistan. Both states use drones for reconnaissance and, increasingly, for hybrid operations. Time and again, small aircraft cross the demarcation line to transport weapons, drugs or explosives. India responds with radar- and jammer-based defence systems, while Pakistan adapts its operational doctrine and surveillance structures. The border is thus becoming a testing ground for modern countermeasures and covert drone operations.

China, on the other hand, is pursuing a more comprehensive strategy. It is systematically integrating drones into its border surveillance – from Xinjiang to Tibet to the South China Sea – and combining their use with strict regulations. Ownership, registration, flight zones and licensing are centrally controlled. At the same time, Beijing is developing sophisticated defence systems, including laser and microwave weapons, as well as AI-based surveillance systems. Here, drones are not merely security instruments, but building blocks of a technologically permeated state doctrine.

The comparison with Africa shows two extremes: on the one hand, states that have hardly any resources to control their airspace; on the other, those that want to secure technological superiority with enormous investments. There is a gap between these two poles – and it is precisely here that the question of whether the global response to the drone era will remain fragmented or can be coordinated will be decided.

Fragmented responses or a global framework?

Drones illustrate, like hardly any other technology, how closely technical progress and governance are intertwined. Where state institutions are weak, drones undermine the monopoly on the use of force. Where they are strong, they become part of strategic power projection.

There is currently no global framework for dealing with drones in a border context. International organisations such as the UN, NATO and the G20 are working on approaches to arms control, regulation and airspace management. However, technological change is outpacing diplomatic adaptation. National solo efforts – such as restrictive drone laws or bilateral agreements – remain the norm.

Yet a coordinated approach would be crucial in this area in particular. This is because the battle for control of airspace is becoming increasingly transnational. Drug and arms routes run across several countries, and drones can take off, fly and disappear across borders. Only through common standards for registration, signal monitoring, data integration and legal jurisdiction can a minimum level of order be established.

Conclusion: The drone era as a test case for global governance

The development of drone technology is not merely a security policy trend, but a yardstick for the adaptability of states. It is forcing governments to rethink their concepts of sovereignty, control and cooperation.

In Africa, drones are exacerbating existing weaknesses, while in Asia they are challenging established power structures. In both cases, it is clear that borders are no longer static entities, but dynamic spaces where technology, politics and society collide.

Whether the international community uses the drone era to develop new forms of cooperation – or whether it remains stuck in a patchwork of reactive measures – will determine whether borders are places of security or vulnerability in the future.