Why the debate on integrated lockdown systems also raises questions of proportionality and social impact

At first glance, Euralarm’s new guidelines on the use of fire detection and alarm systems for lockdown scenarios seem reasonable. Buildings are to be prepared for a wide variety of hazardous situations – from fires and acts of violence to external threats. From a technical perspective, the integration of existing alarm infrastructures appears efficient, cost-effective and organisationally sensible.

Yet it is precisely at this point that a discussion begins which goes far beyond technical security planning: is a genuine security necessity actually being addressed here – or is lockdown increasingly becoming a permanent term exploited for political and social ends?

From an exceptional case to a permanent threat scenario

What is immediately striking is the linguistic and conceptual shift. For decades, fire alarm systems served a very clearly defined purpose: to evacuate people from buildings as quickly and decisively as possible in the event of danger. The logic was simple, universally understandable and directly life-saving.

With the integration of lockdown scenarios, this fundamental idea is changing radically. Suddenly, it is no longer just a matter of guiding people out of a building, but of keeping them inside the building where necessary, restricting movement or sealing off areas.

Of course, real threats do exist – such as rampages, terrorist attacks or violent intruders. The question, however, is whether this automatically necessitates a permanent multi-hazard paradigm for virtually every public infrastructure.

For the more lockdown concepts are integrated into everyday security architectures, the more society’s perception of normality shifts: a state of emergency gradually becomes a permanent state of preparedness.

The security industry between precaution and market logic

There is also another aspect that is rarely discussed openly: security threats create markets. Every new category of risk generates a need for consultancy, technology, standardisation, integration and training.

This does not automatically mean that security providers deliberately generate fear. Nevertheless, there is a structural dynamic in which threat narratives and market interests can reinforce one another. Terms such as ‘resilience’, ‘multi-hazard’, ‘critical infrastructure’ or ‘hybrid threats’ now have enormous political and economic reach.

The result: security concepts are becoming ever more comprehensive, complex and ubiquitous. Buildings are evolving into highly regulated security zones where virtually every scenario is to be technically anticipated.

The real question is therefore not whether technical solutions are possible – but where the line lies between sensible precaution and societal over-regulation.

Psychological side effects are underestimated

The increasing normalisation of lockdown protocols in schools, government offices or public institutions appears particularly problematic. Regular drills, emergency response plans and scenarios for armed attacks may, in theory, improve responsiveness. At the same time, however, they also generate psychological side effects.

If children, pupils or staff are constantly taught that a violent intruder could appear at any time, this alters the sense of security within public spaces in the long term. Social openness is gradually being replaced by risk-based thinking.

Europe, in particular, has so far deliberately distinguished itself from the more militarised security cultures of other regions. The European security architecture has traditionally relied more heavily on de-escalation, civil openness and proportionate risk mitigation. The current development therefore raises the question of whether increasingly Americanised security logic is being imported.

Technical integration creates new complexity

Technically, too, this development is not without risks. The more functions are integrated into central alarm and building systems, the more complex the interdependencies become.

Euralarm rightly emphasises that fire safety must remain the priority at all times. However, the combination of different alarm and response logics inevitably increases the complexity of systems and human decision-making processes.

Particularly in stressful situations, conflicting signals, uncertainties or misinterpretations can have significant consequences. The key strength of traditional fire alarms has always been their simplicity: an alarm means evacuation. Multi-hazard systems undermine this clarity.

There is a further problem: the more digitised security architectures buildings have, the more relevant cyber risks become. Networked lockdown, access and alarm systems simultaneously expand the potential attack surface of critical infrastructure.

Security policy requires proportionality

The crucial question is therefore not whether lockdown systems are technically feasible or sensible in individual cases. The real debate concerns proportionality, societal impact and the setting of priorities.

Not every theoretically conceivable danger automatically justifies a permanent infrastructural security architecture.

Security planning must not be driven exclusively by worst-case scenarios, but must also take into account social openness, suitability for everyday use and psychological consequences.

Particularly in the European context, we should therefore critically examine whether security strategies are increasingly geared towards extreme exceptional cases – and thereby themselves contribute to reinforcing a permanent perception of crisis.

For a resilient society is not created solely by ever more complex alert and lockdown systems, but also through trust, proportionality and the ability to distinguish between real risks and politically amplified threat narratives.