From ticket gates to security architecture: what Germany can learn from other countries

Will access to the platform soon be restricted to holders of a valid ticket only? The idea of platform barriers is back in Germany. Yet even a brief international comparison shows just how vague the term is. The UK primarily checks travel authorisations; France organises boarding; Japan separates access control from platform security; and China establishes a security perimeter with checks on passengers and luggage. Technically, too, the spectrum ranges from smart fare gates to synchronised platform doors. Before Germany decides on barriers, therefore, another question needs answering: what exactly is supposed to be made safer by them?

In Germany, a railway station is more than just a place where trains stop. Large stations are transport hubs, shopping arcades, urban thoroughfares and interchange points all at once. Anyone wishing to reach the platform usually needs neither to pass through a barrier nor to show a ticket. This open principle has evolved over decades – and is now up for debate once again.

The reason for this is not just a single problem. Railway stations have to deal with a wide range of risks: acts of violence against passengers and staff, property offences and pickpocketing, people on the tracks, travelling without a valid ticket, and the question of how to restrict the carrying of knives or other dangerous objects. Added to this are vandalism, unauthorised loitering and the safety of railway staff.

Violence against staff is no abstract concept either. In the first half of 2026, DB Regio recorded a total of 989 assaults on staff, including 781 cases of assault and 185 cases of attempted assault. Dramatic incidents in which people are pushed onto the tracks remain isolated cases, but they too form part of the risk landscape.

Politically, such risks are quickly lumped together under the umbrella term ‘greater safety at stations’. From a security technology perspective, however, they do not belong in the same category. A ticket barrier can restrict access to authorised users. It cannot detect a knife or an intention to commit violence. A platform screen door can prevent or make it more difficult for a person to gain access to the tracks, but it says nothing about who is on the platform. Passenger and luggage checks, on the other hand, can detect dangerous objects – but in doing so fundamentally alter the nature of the station. This is precisely the crux of the debate.

Platform access controls are on the political back burner

In mid-September 2026, Federal Minister of Transport Steffen Bilger proposed trialling access controls at major German stations. He considered it particularly sensible, especially for long-distance travel, to link access to the platform more closely to a valid ticket. At the same time, he pointed out that models from other countries could not simply be transferred to Germany due to the historically developed structure of German stations. No specific pilot locations had been named at the time of the debate.

The shift that has taken place within just a few months is remarkable. As recently as February, the Federal Ministry of Transport had explicitly stated that any potential checks on platforms would initially involve random ticket inspections – certainly not a closed-off access system. A model similar to those in other European countries would require a fundamentally different station layout with appropriate barriers.

Hesse had already raised this issue at the Conference of Transport Ministers in March. Transport Minister Kaweh Mansoori called for an assessment of structural access barriers at major stations; access to the platforms should, in principle, be granted only to passengers with a valid ticket. The state explicitly placed the proposal within the context of a more comprehensive security concept.

The trade unions are also divided on the issue. The GdP Federal Police | Customs branch calls for access to platforms and trains to be granted exclusively to those with a valid ticket and regards access controls as one component alongside increased staffing, CCTV and AI. PRO BAHN, on the other hand, rejects a return to platform barriers. Among other things, the association argues that a valid ticket says nothing about the potential danger posed by its holder, and points to short changing times, shared platforms and accompanying persons who do not intend to travel themselves.

The media debate also reflects these opposing views. Critics point to potential waiting times, high conversion costs and the limited protective effect against people who themselves hold a valid ticket. Supporters, on the other hand, see access barriers as a potential piece of the jigsaw in a broader security strategy. Politically, therefore, the barrier is back on the agenda. Technologically, however, the discussion is further advanced than the current initiative would suggest.

Three barriers, three functions

The term ‘platform barrier’ encompasses at least three different systems.

A fare gate checks authorisation: ticket, smartcard, QR code, smartphone or other digital medium. If the authorisation is valid, the gate opens. Modern sensor technology can also detect whether a second person is following immediately behind, whether someone is walking in the opposite direction to that intended, or whether several people are using a single authorisation.

A platform screen door or platform barrier, on the other hand, is located at the edge of the platform. It separates passengers from the track and opens in synchronisation with the arriving train. Its purpose is not to check tickets, but to physically secure the interface between people and the train.

A security check, on the other hand, screens people and objects. This requires, for example, metal detection, baggage scanners, liquid or explosive detection, and staff to carry out follow-up checks.

So, what a ticket gate fails to detect is not a technical fault. It is simply not its purpose.

This distinction is crucial for the assessment. A system can very effectively make it difficult to travel without valid authorisation and yet still be unsuitable for preventing a knife attack. Similarly, a platform screen door can offer excellent protection against people entering the track area without providing any information about the people behind it.

Germany has long been investigating the technology

This distinction is already evident in the research project SicaB – Safety at Stations. DB InfraGO, Frankfurt University of Applied Sciences and the Institute of Transport Science at RWTH Aachen University investigated access controls and platform barriers as distinct security measures.

Analyses of passenger flow and theoretical considerations concluded that, under certain conditions, suitable measures could in principle be integrated into small, medium and large German stations. In September 2025, a practical trial took place at Berlin Olympiastadion station involving more than 400 test participants, an S-Bahn train and simulated platform elements.

This shifts the focus from the question of feasibility in principle to that of the specific architectural design.

A terminus station presents different challenges to a through station. Security checks can be arranged relatively clearly in front of individual tracks at a terminus station. It becomes more difficult where the same underpass provides access to several platforms, or where a passenger has to change from a regional train to an ICE within a few minutes. If each track is checked separately, additional checkpoints are required. If, on the other hand, a larger platform area is cordoned off as a single unit, the boundary between public and controlled space shifts.

Platform doors also present greater challenges in the German mainline rail system than in a standardised metro system. Different types of rolling stock have different train lengths and door positions. What can be standardised relatively easily in a homogeneous underground system must be designed with considerably greater flexibility in long-distance and regional rail services.

SicaB therefore demonstrates not so much a single solution as something else: As soon as access control meets the German mainline rail system, it becomes an infrastructure project.

And what does the law permit?

Section 62 of the Railway Construction and Operating Regulations provides an interesting starting point. According to this, railway facilities may be entered or used by persons not officially authorised, provided they serve general transport purposes or a specific right of use justifies such access. Remaining on the tracks is, in principle, not permitted.

The provision neither prescribes automatic access gates nor guarantees unrestricted access to every platform. It therefore does not, on its own, dictate either a strictly open or a strictly closed station model.

In the case of a specific facility, further requirements would be decisive in any event: operational and fire safety, accessibility, escape and rescue routes, crowd flow planning and safe operation in the event of a disruption. A gate that reliably controls access during normal operation can itself become a risk in the event of an evacuation if it does not automatically and transparently switch to a safe state.

It is at this point, at the very latest, that it becomes clear: the gate is not just part of the ticketing system. It becomes part of building security.

Four countries, four approaches to security

Looking abroad is particularly helpful because it shows just how little the blanket statement ‘Other countries have turnstiles too’ actually explains.

United Kingdom: Who is authorised to travel?

In the UK, ticket gates are established at numerous stations. Their primary purpose, however, is not to screen for dangerous items, but to demarcate the area reserved for paying passengers.

A current investment programme illustrates just how clearly this function takes centre stage. In July 2026, the UK Department for Transport allocated around 33.4 million pounds for new and improved ticket gates in England. The government explicitly justifies the investment as a means of combating fare evasion; according to its figures, up to 400 million pounds in revenue is at stake each year.

The British ticket barrier therefore primarily answers the question: D Is this person permitted to enter the paid passenger area?

This is access control. It is not a security check based on the airport model.

France: Boarding begins in front of the train

France takes a different approach, particularly on long-distance services. SNCF operates so-called portes d’embarquement at major stations. These gates check tickets and regulate access to the respective platform.

Access to the TGV INOUI is usually granted once the track has been announced, around 20 minutes before departure. The aim is to verify the passenger’s right to travel, regulate access to the platform and ensure an orderly boarding process.

This is an important difference. France does not necessarily turn the entire station into a closed security zone. The boundary is only established where the general station area gives way to a train’s departure area.

For major German stations, this particular solution would not be easy to replicate everywhere. In many places, ICE, Regional Express and S-Bahn services share underpasses, staircases or even platforms. The French boarding model therefore comes up against a different network and station layout.

Japan: The passenger area ends before the platform

Japan separates the two functions particularly clearly.

Automatic ticket gates control access to the passenger area. On the Shinkansen, there are additional gates and transfer gates between the high-speed and conventional networks.

Independently of this, Japan has been expanding its installation of platform doors and movable platform barriers for years. By the end of the 2024 financial year, 2,830 platform tracks at 1,190 stations had already been equipped accordingly. The systems are designed, in particular, to prevent falls from the platform and unauthorised access to the track area.

Japan therefore addresses two separate questions: Who is allowed into the passenger area? And how do we prevent anyone from entering the hazardous track area from the passenger area?

It is precisely this distinction that is of interest to Germany. A ticket gate and a platform screen door are not competing variants of the same technology. They operate at different levels of security.

China: Who is allowed in – and what are they carrying?

China goes significantly further.

The railway system operates on a real-name ticketing system. Identity details are stored with the relevant tickets; the identity document used also serves as proof of identity when checking in or leaving the station.

In addition, security checks are mandatory. High-speed rail stations and larger conventional stations must, amongst other things, provide baggage screening equipment, metal detector gates, handheld metal detectors, liquid detectors and explosive detection equipment. The security check areas must be monitored by CCTV.

Also noteworthy is the operational requirement: the number of open security check lanes is to be adjusted to passenger volumes; the standard waiting time should, as a rule, not exceed five minutes.

China thus answers a third question: What may an authorised person bring into the controlled area?

The gate becomes a security perimeter.

Can a controlled station also become a more pleasant place?

The debate need not therefore end with violence and travel authorisation. Access control also changes who uses a space and for what purpose.

The Netherlands provides an interesting insight into this. A scientific study analysed data from around 260 NS stations between 2013 and 2018. At 76 of these stations, access gates were put into operation during this period. Adjusted for passenger numbers and time-constant differences between stations, the recorded crime rate in the model fell by around nine per cent compared with stations without gates following the introduction of the gates.

The researchers attribute this effect, amongst other things, to situational crime prevention: anyone without a valid ticket can no longer simply use the controlled area as a place to linger or pass through.

This does not yet prove that access gates automatically prevent pickpocketing or make stations cleaner. Pickpockets, in particular, can still find attractive opportunities to commit offences even within a controlled area when it is crowded.

Nor is there, as yet, any conclusive evidence of a direct cause-and-effect relationship regarding cleanliness. However, an indirect effect is plausible: If access control alters the composition and use of a space, it can also change the extent of unauthorised loitering, vandalism and, in the long term, the quality of the environment. This should be measured in pilot projects – not simply assumed.

This in particular could represent a perspective that has so far received little attention. A railway station is not simply safe or unsafe. It can appear well-organised, well-maintained and subjectively pleasant – or the opposite. Security technology may therefore influence not only what is prevented, but also the kind of space that emerges behind a boundary.

European technology is available

Germany would not need to reinvent such systems from scratch. The European market offers both intelligent access gates and platform barriers.

The German manufacturer Scheidt & Bachmann, based in Mönchengladbach, offers the FareGo PG|50, an automated fare gate for public transport. A high-resolution system with 120 sensors is designed, amongst other things, to detect unauthorised passage; the system is conceived as a component of digital fare collection architectures.

The Belgian manufacturer Automatic Systems is moving in a similar direction with its FirstLane gates. The integrated detection system tracks the passage of people; the manufacturer quotes a throughput of up to 60 users per minute.

At first glance, this sounds like a mere product detail. For rail operations, however, it is crucial. A gate that perfectly verifies a single passenger but causes several hundred people to become bottlenecked following the arrival of a delayed ICE is not a suitable transport solution. Throughput itself becomes a safety factor here.

On the other side of the platform, a different market is emerging.

The Swiss manufacturer Gilgen Door Systems develops and manufactures platform screen doors in Schwarzenburg near Bern and states that it has now commissioned more than 13,000 platform door systems.

Knorr-Bremse, based in Munich, is also one of the established suppliers. Its portfolio ranges from fully enclosed platform screen doors and platform edge doors to lower barriers. The manufacturer cites installations in London, Paris, Copenhagen, Brescia and Thessaloniki, amongst others; the systems can be installed as new or retrofitted.

Then there is Portalp Railway from France, which specialises in the development, installation, maintenance and retrofitting of platform screen door systems. Its technical solutions also incorporate emergency exits, surveillance and safety-critical control functions.

According to publicly available sources, none of these manufacturers has been selected for potential German pilot projects. Rather, they demonstrate that the hardware is, in principle, available.

The more difficult work begins after that.

The actual technology lies behind the barrier

A fare gate requires a backend system that can handle different types of tickets and fare systems. It must manage digital tickets, season tickets and special cases, adopt a defined state in the event of a communication or power failure, and reliably allow people with wheelchairs, pushchairs or luggage to pass through.

Above all, it must be integrated into the building’s safety logic. What happens in the event of a fire alarm? Do all gates open? Can emergency services enter against the usual direction of passenger flow? What happens if three out of ten lanes fail? How do operators prevent a safety measure from causing a dangerous build-up of passengers?

In the case of platform screen doors, train and door detection are also required. The system must know where the train is and when which door may be opened safely. This is comparatively straightforward for metros with homogeneous rolling stock fleets. In German long-distance and regional rail services, with their diverse ranges of rolling stock, it is considerably more challenging.

It is at this point, at the very latest, that cybersecurity also becomes part of physical security. A digitally controlled access decision depends on software, the network and the backend. If these systems are disrupted or compromised, this directly affects physical operations.

And from an organisational perspective, too, the security chain does not end at the sensor. If a gate detects an unauthorised passage, this initially results in nothing more than a piece of information. Someone must receive it, assess it and, if necessary, intervene.

The platform gate would thus be less a single product than the end device of a security architecture.

The open system comes at a price – as does the closed one

This is precisely why the German debate cannot be reduced to ‘barriers: yes or no’.

An open station offers short distances, flexible connections and a seamless transition between the city, retail and transport. However, it also allows people to enter platform areas whose presence there is not linked to a journey.

A closed system can restrict this group of people, bring ticket checks forward and create a more clearly defined space. At the same time, it creates new dependencies: on technology, space, maintenance, staff, evacuation planning and a functioning ticketing system.

Added to this is a simple truth regarding security technology: The effectiveness of a barrier depends on what it controls.

A British fare gate primarily checks a passenger’s right to travel. A French boarding gate regulates access to a specific train. A Japanese platform door separates people from the tracks. A Chinese checkpoint additionally screens passengers and luggage.

All four systems may be referred to in everyday language as ‘platform barriers’. From a security engineering perspective, however, they represent different architectures.

For German pilot projects, it would therefore be of interest not only to know how many people per minute can pass through a gate. It would also be necessary to measure the impact on changeover times, unauthorised access, property and violent offences, people on the tracks, accessibility, evacuation, system failures, the subjective perception of safety, and possibly even the quality of the environment and cleanliness.

Only then would it be possible to determine what actual benefits a new barrier brings. After all, a station does not become safer simply because a door closes somewhere. The crucial question is rather: Who or what is this door intended to stop – and what should happen if it does?