As governments and infrastructure operators invest in resilience, the facilities responsible for emergency response deserve greater attention. Germany’s experience with fire station protection shows why modernisation and new construction should address operational continuity from the outset – and offers lessons for security professionals far beyond Germany.

Critical infrastructure resilience is usually discussed in terms of energy grids, water supply, telecommunications, transport, healthcare or digital infrastructure. Governments, municipalities and operators are investing in physical protection, redundancy, emergency preparedness and business continuity to ensure that essential services remain available during natural disasters, technical failures, sabotage, cyber incidents and other major disruptions.

Yet resilience has another layer that can easily be overlooked: What happens to the organisations expected to respond when critical systems fail?

Fire and rescue services are a prime example. Their stations accommodate emergency vehicles, communications equipment, protective gear and specialist technology. They serve as operational hubs from which personnel and resources are deployed when other parts of society are already under pressure.

A fire station should therefore not be treated simply as another public building. Its loss can have consequences far beyond the value of the property itself. If vehicles, equipment and operational infrastructure are destroyed simultaneously, the incident can impair a community’s ability to respond to subsequent emergencies.

As investment in critical infrastructure increases, municipalities should therefore consider the resilience of their own emergency response infrastructure. Where ageing fire stations are being refurbished, expanded or replaced, there is an opportunity to rethink not only space, energy efficiency and working conditions, but also the protection of the operational capability itself.

Germany has experienced a case that demonstrates the issue particularly clearly – and the lessons are relevant internationally.

When the Emergency Service Becomes the Emergency

In October 2024, a major fire destroyed the vehicle hall of a fire station in Stadtallendorf, a town in the German state of Hesse. Emergency vehicles and equipment were lost, and the financial damage ran into tens of millions of euros.

The significance of the incident went far beyond the material loss. The affected facility belonged to the organisation responsible for responding to fires and other emergencies.

The incident subsequently triggered a broader discussion in Germany about the protection of fire stations themselves.

In 2025, the German security technology association BHE addressed the issue in its publication Fire Protection of Fire Stations and Fire Service Vehicles. Taking the Stadtallendorf incident as a starting point, the paper highlighted potential weaknesses in the protection of facilities whose operational availability is itself important to public safety.

The publication dates from 2025 and is therefore not a new document. Against the backdrop of current investment in resilience and critical infrastructure, however, the issue it addresses has gained additional relevance.

Its central question is highly transferable: If emergency response is part of a community’s resilience strategy, shouldn’t the resilience of emergency response facilities themselves be treated as a critical requirement?

Critical Infrastructure Is a System of Dependencies

Germany currently provides an interesting context for this discussion. The country is strengthening the physical resilience of critical infrastructure as part of a broader European effort to ensure that essential services remain operational during serious disruptions.

This does not mean that every German fire station is automatically classified as critical infrastructure, nor does it create a blanket requirement for municipalities to rebuild or modernise their fire stations.

The broader principle is more important.

Critical infrastructure does not operate in isolation.

A power grid may become more resilient, but a major incident can still require fire and rescue services. Water utilities may strengthen physical protection, yet they remain dependent on communications, energy, transport and emergency response capabilities. Hospitals may improve backup power and emergency planning but still rely on functioning roads, telecommunications, public authorities and emergency services.

Modern resilience planning therefore has to consider dependencies between systems, rather than protecting individual assets in isolation.

Fire stations, emergency control centres and other facilities supporting civil protection belong in that analysis.

Fire Stations Require a Different Risk Perspective

The protection objectives of a conventional building generally focus on life safety, regulatory compliance and property protection.

For a fire station, another objective must be considered: continuity of operational capability.

A single incident may simultaneously affect the building, emergency vehicles, communications technology, protective equipment and specialist resources. Even if personnel remain unharmed, the organisation can lose a substantial part of its response capability within minutes.

This changes the risk calculation.

When determining an appropriate level of protection, decision-makers should not simply ask how much the building is worth. They should assess the consequences if the facility becomes unavailable.

How quickly can replacement vehicles be provided? Can crews operate from another station? Are communications and specialist equipment redundant? Would response times increase? Which geographical area depends on the facility? And what happens if the loss occurs during a wider crisis in which neighbouring emergency services are already under pressure?

Such questions transform fire protection from a building-services issue into a resilience and operational continuity issue.

Modernisation Creates an Opportunity

Many fire stations were built for an operational environment very different from today’s.

Emergency vehicles have become larger and more technically complex. Communications and IT requirements have changed. Occupational health and safety standards have evolved, while charging infrastructure, energy systems and specialist equipment have added new technical demands.

Municipalities are therefore already facing decisions about refurbishing, expanding or replacing ageing facilities.

These projects provide an opportunity to rethink the security architecture of the station as a whole.

Fire protection should not be added late in the construction process as another technical package. The protection strategy should be considered from the beginning.

Which areas represent the greatest risk? How quickly must a developing fire be detected? How are alarms transmitted? Who receives them when the station is unoccupied? How are faults in the detection system identified? What happens during a power or communications failure? And should detection extend beyond the building into the emergency vehicles themselves?

Answering these questions early allows architecture, technical building services, power supplies, alarm transmission and operational procedures to be designed as one system.

The objective should not simply be a modern building.

It should be a resilient operational base.

Early Detection Matters – but Not Every Detector Serves the Same Purpose

One of the key issues raised in the German discussion concerns the technology used for fire detection.

Simple domestic smoke alarms and consumer smart-home systems may appear to provide an inexpensive means of monitoring a building. But technology designed primarily for residential environments does not necessarily provide the level of supervision expected in a facility whose availability is important to emergency response.

A domestic smoke alarm is primarily intended to warn occupants of a dwelling.

A professional fire detection solution may need to perform additional functions. It may monitor detectors and communication paths, supervise power supplies, identify faults, report changes in system status and transmit alarms to defined recipients.

This distinction is particularly important at facilities that are not continuously staffed.

Many volunteer fire stations, for example, may remain empty for extended periods. A developing fire cannot therefore depend on someone being present to identify smoke, unusual smells or other early indicators.

Automated detection becomes more important – but so does the reliability of the detection system itself.

The broader lesson for security professionals is straightforward:

The protection technology should correspond to the consequence of failure.

A Security System Must Know When It Is No Longer Secure

This is one of the most transferable principles from the German discussion.

A fire detection system should not only detect a fire. In a safety-critical environment, operators also need to know when the system’s ability to detect a fire has been compromised.

A depleted battery, failed detector, interrupted communication path or contaminated sensor can create a dangerous situation if the system continues to appear operational.

Professional security therefore requires more than alarm functionality. It requires system supervision.

The principle applies well beyond fire detection.

An access control system should report relevant failures. An intrusion detection system should identify tampering. Video surveillance requires monitoring of cameras and recording systems. Backup power is only useful if its availability is tested and faults are recognised. Emergency communications must be monitored if operational decisions depend on them.

For resilience planning, detecting the failure of a protection system can be almost as important as detecting the original threat.

The Vehicles Themselves Deserve Attention

Another important aspect is that fire protection should not necessarily stop at the walls of the vehicle hall.

Modern emergency vehicles contain extensive electrical and electronic equipment. Batteries, chargers, radios, computers, portable equipment and other systems may remain powered or connected to charging infrastructure while vehicles are parked.

A fire originating inside a vehicle may therefore develop before smoke or heat reaches a detector positioned elsewhere in a large vehicle bay.

The BHE publication from 2025 consequently drew attention to the potential value of fire detection within vehicle interiors. Earlier detection can reduce the time between ignition and alarm – a potentially decisive factor when several high-value vehicles are parked close together.

At the same time, vehicle interiors represent a demanding technical environment.

Vibration, contamination, gases, temperature variations and other conditions differ substantially from those inside conventional buildings. Equipment used for detection therefore needs to be appropriate for the actual operating environment.

This is another lesson that extends beyond Germany and beyond fire stations:

Security technology should be selected according to the environment in which it must perform, not simply according to where similar technology has been used before.

Think of the Building and Fleet as One Protection Environment

For new fire station projects, this opens up a different way of thinking about protection.

Instead of designing the building fire detection system first and considering the vehicles separately, planners can treat the station, vehicle hall and emergency fleet as an interconnected protection environment.

Where could an incident originate? How quickly would it be detected? How would an alarm be verified? Where would the information be transmitted? What action would follow? And what happens if one part of the protection chain fails?

A risk-based design might combine building detection with vehicle monitoring, supervised alarm transmission, automatic fault reporting, emergency power and defined escalation procedures.

Other systems may also be integrated where appropriate, including access control, intrusion detection, video surveillance or building management.

The objective is not to install as much technology as possible.

It is to create a protection concept in which detection, communication and response work together and in which critical single points of failure are understood and, where possible, reduced.

Existing Stations Need Different Strategies

New construction offers the opportunity to integrate security, fire protection, communications and power infrastructure from the beginning.

Existing fire stations present a different challenge.

Installing new cabling may require significant structural work. Building operations may need to continue during refurbishment. Municipal budgets can limit the scale of intervention, particularly where authorities operate numerous smaller or volunteer stations.

Professional wireless fire detection can therefore be one option for certain retrofit projects. The German BHE paper points, for example, to certified wireless solutions designed for professional fire detection environments, including capabilities such as battery and signal supervision and automatic status and fault reporting.

This should not be interpreted as a universal recommendation for wireless technology.

The appropriate solution depends on the building, risk assessment, national regulations, fire protection strategy and operational requirements.

But the principle is important: Increasing resilience does not always require rebuilding the entire facility.

Well-planned retrofit measures can significantly improve the protection of existing infrastructure.

From Construction Project to Resilience Project

For municipalities and public authorities, this requires a change in perspective.

A conventional fire station project may focus on construction costs, vehicle bays, staff areas, occupational safety, energy efficiency and regulatory compliance.

A resilience-oriented project adds another set of questions:

• Which functions of this facility are essential during an emergency?
• Which events could make those functions unavailable?
• Which assets represent single points of failure?
• How quickly must a fire or other threat be detected?
• Are protection systems themselves continuously supervised?
• What happens if grid power fails?
• Can alarm transmission continue if normal communications are disrupted?
• Can part of the station remain operational if another area becomes unusable?
• Are vehicles, IT, communications and specialist equipment protected as operational assets rather than simply as building contents?

These questions can influence architecture, fire compartmentation, technical building services, power infrastructure, security systems and organisational procedures.

They can also prevent expensive retrofits.

If resilience requirements are defined before procurement and construction, cable routes, backup power, interfaces and technical infrastructure can be incorporated into the original design.

Adding them afterwards is usually more difficult and more expensive.

Fire Protection Is Only One Layer of Resilience

Fire detection should therefore be considered part of a broader protection strategy.

A resilient fire station may require emergency power, redundant communications, physical access control, intrusion protection, secure IT infrastructure, cybersecurity for connected systems, protected storage and contingency procedures for the loss of external utilities.

The appropriate measures will depend on the location, operational role and threat environment.

This is where the German example becomes particularly useful for an international security audience.

The original BHE publication focused primarily on fire protection. The underlying logic, however, applies to the entire security architecture:

The importance of the operational function should influence the robustness of its protection.

A fire station that forms a central node in regional emergency response may justify a different level of redundancy and security from a conventional municipal building of similar size.

The same reasoning can apply to ambulance stations, emergency control rooms, civil protection depots and other facilities supporting public safety.

Cost Must Be Measured Against Consequence

Municipalities operate under financial constraints. Investment in fire stations competes with schools, roads, healthcare, utilities and many other public priorities.

Professional protection can therefore appear to be an additional cost.

Resilience requires a different calculation.

The relevant comparison is not simply between the acquisition cost of a basic detector and a professional detection system. Decision-makers should consider the lifecycle cost of protection alongside the potential consequences of losing the facility.

Those consequences can include reconstruction, replacement vehicles, specialist equipment, temporary accommodation, operational relocation and additional logistical costs.

The most important consequence, however, may be more difficult to quantify: reduced emergency response capability.

The appropriate level of investment should therefore follow a structured assessment of risk, operational importance and consequence of failure.

Not every fire station requires the maximum level of technical protection. But every station should have a level of protection that reflects the role it performs and the consequences if that role suddenly becomes unavailable.

Lessons Beyond Germany

The BHE publication dates from 2025 and was developed within the German technical and regulatory environment. It should therefore not be understood as an international standard or as a direct specification for projects elsewhere.

Its value for international security professionals lies in the questions it raises.

Different countries will have different building regulations, fire detection standards, emergency service structures and responsibilities. Some operate predominantly professional fire services; others rely heavily on volunteer organisations. Funding models and municipal responsibilities also vary.

But the methodology can travel across borders:

Identify the critical function. Assess the consequences of its loss. Analyse the actual operating environment. Define the required protection performance. Select appropriate technology. Monitor the protection system itself. Plan for disruption and recovery.

This approach can be applied not only to fire stations but to ambulance facilities, police infrastructure, emergency operations centres, civil protection depots and other sites that support society during major disruptions.

It can also inform private-sector resilience planning. Industrial emergency response teams, site fire brigades, security control rooms and crisis management centres face a similar challenge: the systems responsible for managing an emergency must themselves remain available during that emergency.

Protecting Critical Infrastructure Means Protecting Response Capability

Investment in critical infrastructure resilience will continue as governments and operators respond to geopolitical risks, extreme weather, technological dependencies and increasingly interconnected systems.

The opportunity is to avoid treating resilience as a collection of isolated infrastructure projects.

Energy, water, telecommunications, healthcare, transport and public administration depend on supporting capabilities. Emergency services are among the most important.

Germany’s experience with fire station protection illustrates the issue in unusually concrete terms. A facility designed to respond to emergencies became the site of a major emergency itself. The debate that followed has raised questions about professional fire detection, system supervision, vehicle protection and the wider resilience of emergency response infrastructure.

For municipalities planning new stations or modernising existing facilities, the lesson is clear: protection should be integrated at the beginning of the project, not added at the end.

For security professionals outside Germany, the most important conclusion is broader still:

Critical infrastructure resilience is incomplete if the organisations expected to respond to its failure are themselves vulnerable to preventable disruption.

Fire stations should therefore be considered not merely as buildings requiring protection, but as operational assets whose continued availability forms part of the resilience of the communities they serve.